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Abstract 
 
We study compensation packages in family and non-family firms. Using French matched 
employer-employee data, we first show that family firms pay on average lower wages. We 
find that part of this wage gap is due to low wage workers sorting into family firms and high 
wage workers sorting into non-family firms. However, we also find evidence that company 
wage policies differ according to ownership status, so that the same worker is paid differently 
under family and non-family firm ownership. We also find evidence that family firms are 
characterised by lower job insecurity, as measured by dismissal rates and by the subjective 
risk of dismissal perceived by workers. In addition, family firms appear to rely less on 
dismissals – and more on hiring reductions – than non-family firms when they downsize. We 
show that compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse 
relationship between the family/non-family gaps in wages and job security.  
 
 
    3 
Introduction 
Firm heterogeneity has attracted much interest in recent years. There is growing evidence that, 
even within narrowly-defined industries, firms are persistently heterogeneous in several 
respects, including productivity, employment dynamics and wages, and that this is partly 
explained by firm specific attributes (see e.g. Syverson, 2011, Davis et al., 2006, Abowd et 
al., 1999b). One key characteristic of the firm is corporate ownership, with the two most 
common types of ownership being family firms and firms with no dominant owner. The 
literature on family firms has traditionally focused on corporate performance, trying to assess 
whether family firms are efficient
1
In this paper, we study compensation packages in family and non-family firms. We focus on 
wages and job security of both managerial and non-managerial workers. We find that family 
ownership is associated with lower wages and greater job security and that this partly reflects 
compensating wage differentials. Nevertheless, we also find evidence that the family/non-
 or whether they give rise to private benefits of control (see 
e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).  
The consequences of firm ownership for employee compensation  have been much less 
researched so far. The existing literature focuses almost exclusively on CEO and managerial 
pay, with most papers suggesting that top executives earn less in family firms than in non 
family ones – see Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003), Bach and Serrano-Velarde (2009) and Bandiera 
et al. (2010). In contrast, the pay level of non-managerial workers has been largely neglected. 
Moreover, employee compensation cannot be reduced simply to pay. It has been shown that 
workers are concerned by job insecurity – and, in particular, by the risk of job loss (see 
Valletta, 2000, Nickell et al., 2002 and Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009) – and that they are 
ready to trade-off lower wages against less churning by their employer (Böckerman et al. 
2011). The literature in finance suggests that families have longer time horizons than non-
family shareholders so that they can more credibly commit to implicit contracts (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003). As a consequence, family firms would have a comparative advantage at 
establishing long-term employment relations, thereby offering greater job security to their 
employees (Stavrou et al., 2006). 
                                                 
1 The empirical evidence on this point is far from being clear cut. Some papers find that family firms out-
perform widely-held firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007; 
Fahlentrach, 2009). In contrast, other studies provide evidence that family firms under-perform (Claessens et al, 
2000; Morck et al, 2000; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) in particular when control 
is passed on to the descendants (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et al, 2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2010).   4 
family wage gap is partly due to assortative matching, with high-ability workers sorting into 
high-paying non-family firms and low-ability workers ending up in family firms. 
We build a unique dataset by matching individual and establishment-level data on firm 
ownership, company accounts, establishment characteristics, worker flows and employees' 
social security records including wages. Looking at evidence on family firms in France is 
interesting since they account for a large share of national employment. Our dataset contains a 
cross-section of about 2,000 establishments in 2004 – of which a vast majority are not listed 
on the stock market – and longitudinal information on a subset of establishments and workers. 
Using these data, we estimate Mincerian wage equations augmented by family ownership. 
Controlling for standard workers' characteristics and establishment observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, we find that gross hourly wages are about 5% lower in family firms than in 
non-family companies. We find that part of this wage gap is due to differences in unobserved 
characteristics of workers across family and non-family firms. When a family firm becomes 
non-family owned, low-ability workers tend to leave, while leavers tend to be high-ability 
workers when the transition takes place in the opposite direction. We interpret this 
observation as evidence of assortative matching. However, we also find that company wage 
policies change when ownership changes, so that workers staying in the same firm enjoy on 
average  a  3%  pay increase when a family firm becomes non-family owned and suffer a 
similar pay drop when the ownership transition occurs the other way round.  
These changes in pay are mirrored by changes in job security. Using quarterly data on hirings 
and separations, we first show that a switch from family to non-family ownership is 
associated with a substantial increase in the dismissal rate  (and vice versa).  We also 
investigate whether family firms rely less on dismissals than non-family firms when they 
downsize, and find that this is actually the case. This is crucial for incumbent workers: if 
employed in a family firm, they face a lower risk of job loss when the firm is hit by a negative 
shock and has to destroy jobs. When this occurs, family firms appear to reduce hirings more 
and increase dismissals less than non-family firms, in order to accommodate the required 
staffing changes. These results are confirmed by subjective data: the risk of dismissal 
perceived by workers is significantly lower in family firms than in non-family ones. 
The fact that family firms offer lower wages and greater job security suggests that a 
compensating wage differential mechanism may be at play. We find that this is actually the 
case for workers who stay in the same establishment when firm ownership changes: half of 
the wage increase they benefit from when a family firm becomes non-family owned appears   5 
to be a compensation for the rise in the risk of dismissal associated with that ownership 
transition.  
Our paper is one of the very few investigating non-managerial pay in family firms. The only 
other paper we are aware of is Sraer and Thesmar (2007). On a repeated cross-section of 
French listed firms over 1994-2000, they estimate firm-level wage equations. Controlling for 
the workforce’s occupational structure, they find a wage penalty of about 4.5% in family 
firms run by heir CEOs as compared to widely-held companies. Our paper shows that a 
similar family/non-family wage gap is also found when including non-listed companies. This 
is a key point since non-listed firms typically represent a very large share of employment. 
Moreover it allows us to have greater over-time variation in ownership status in our sample: 
listed companies are often large holdings which rarely change ownership whereas non-listed 
firms include subsidiaries which may be sold by one holding to another one, leading to a 
larger amount of ownership changes between family and non-family holders. This allows us 
to improve on Sraer and Thesmar (2007) on a second dimension, namely the control for 
unobserved  heterogeneity across establishments  and workers.  In such a way,  we  can 
distinguish between assortative matching and the direct effect of family ownership in 
determining the pay level of individual employees. 
Our paper also contributes to a second strand of literature which focuses on job security in 
family firms. So far, most papers have tackled this issue only indirectly. Stavrou et al. (2006) 
and Block (2010) investigate the relationship between corporate ownership and downsizing. 
Both papers find that family ownership is associated with smaller employment reductions 
conditional to  downsizing.  The  key  problem in interpreting these results is that  a given 
amount of  job destruction can result from either  voluntary quits  or  hiring reductions  or 
dismissals,  and that only dismissals affect job security of  incumbent workers. Sraer and 
Thesmar (2007) study the covariation of firm employment changes and industry-level shocks. 
They find that employment growth at the firm level is less sensitive to industry-level shocks 
in family firms than in non-family ones.
2
                                                 
2 In addition, D'Aurizio and Romano (2011) show that employment adjustments following a business-cycle 
downturn are more concentrated in subsidiaries (with respect to headquarters) in family firms than in non-family 
ones.  
 However, here again, the focus is on employment 
reduction rather than on dismissals. We improve on these papers by directly focusing on the 
risk of job loss for incumbent workers. As far as we know, our paper is the first one to show 
that family firms display lower rates of dismissals. Consistent with this evidence, we also find   6 
that workers in family firms perceive a lower risk of job loss. This set of results, we argue, 
provides direct evidence of greater job security in family firms. 
Finally, as far as we know, our paper is also the first showing direct evidence suggesting that 
compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse relationship 
between the family/non-family gaps in wages and job security. 
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the empirical strategy. 
Section 2 describes the dataset and presents summary statistics. Section 3 reports results on 
the relationship between family ownership, wages and job security. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Empirical specification 
1.1 Wage equations 
In the first part of this article, we estimate the relationship between family ownership and 
wages. In order to do so, we  start from a standard wage equation (see Mincer, 1974), 
augmented with family ownership: 
  ij j i j ij Z X F w ε + β + α + γ = log     (1) 
where  ij w is the gross hourly wage of worker i employed in establishment j estimated for the 
year 2004 – the year for which we have ownership data for most establishments –  j F  is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm to which the establishment belongs is family-owned 
and 0 otherwise,  i X  is a vector of individual characteristics including occupation, age and 
tenure. We also control for a set of establishment and firm-level  characteristics  ( j Z ) 
including, among others, a large set of industry and regional dummies. Finally,  ij ε  is an error 
term.
3
One issue with this simple cross-section model is that estimates may be flawed by unobserved 
heterogeneity across establishments. For a subset of establishments, we have ownership status 
in 1998 and 2004. In order to control for heterogeneity in unobservable time-invariant 
 
                                                 
3 Our dataset is representative of the population of establishments in the French private sector. All individual 
regressions in this paper are therefore weighted by the inverse of the number of observations of each 
establishment, in order to give the same weight to each establishment. By avoiding that our results be driven by 
larger firms and plants, this also maintains comparability with establishment-level equations, such as those on 
separations (see below). In addition, as the source of variation of ownership status is at the level of firms, errors 
are assumed to be correlated within firms.   7 
characteristics, we re-estimate equation (1) on the pooled sample covering both available 
years,  including a time dummy and establishment fixed effects.  However, in this 
specification, the effect of F is identified by transitions between ownership statuses, which is 
potentially endogenous because  firms changing ownership  status  might be different from 
other firms and these differences might be correlated with wage changes. We do not have a 
valid instrument for the change in F. However if firms changing ownership were on average 
different from others, we would expect this to be reflected in some differences in pre-change 
characteristics (such as firm age as well as level and growth of profitability, productivity, 
wages or size). Therefore, in order to validate our identification strategy, we check that ∆F is 
uncorrelated with pre-change firm characteristics.
4
ij j ij j ij i ij Leaver F Leaver X w ε µ δ β α + + ∆ + + = * log 1998 , 1998 ,
 
A natural explanation of why wages may differ across family and non-family firms is that 
workers may be different in both types of companies. If, for any reason, workers with specific 
(unobservable) characteristics tend to match with family (resp. non-family) firms, the pattern 
of wages that we observe may be partly due to this assortative matching mechanism. In order 
to investigate this issue, we estimate the following equations:  
    (2) 
  ij j ij j ij i ij Arriver F Arriver X w ε µ δ β α + ′ + ∆ ′ + ′ + ′ = * log 2004 , 2004 ,   (3) 
where  j F ∆  is the change in ownership over the period (namely family ownership in 2004 
minus family ownership in 1998) and µj and µ'j are establishment fixed effects. Leaverij is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the worker was in establishment j in 1998 and was not there 
any longer in 2004, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Arriverij is a dummy variable taking value 1 if 
the worker was not in establishment j in 1998 but was there in 2004 and 0 otherwise.
5
δ′
 In this 
set-up, any estimate of δ and/or   significantly different from 0 suggests that workers with 
specific unobservable characteristics correlated with the wage level leave (or join) family 
firms when they become non-family (or vice versa), hence providing an indication of 
assortative matching between workers and firms. More precisely, provided that the coefficient 
δ does not depend on the direction of the transition, δ > 0 indicates that the difference in 1998 
                                                 
4 We also check that the coefficient of F does not depend on the direction of the ownership transition (see 
Section 3 below). 
5 Let us underline that in the vast majority of cases we do not have information on the type of ownership (either 
family or non-family) of the firm the worker goes to when she leaves establishment j or where she comes from 
when arriving at establishment j. This is due to the fact that those firms do not belong to the REPONSE dataset 
which provides us with the information on ownership – see Section 2.    8 
wage levels between leavers and stayers is greater in non-family firms becoming family-
owned (and smaller in family-firms becoming non-family-owned) than in firms remaining in 
the same ownership status, which we use as a sort of control group. The same holds for δ′ as 
regards the difference in 2004 wage levels between arrivers and stayers. 
Beside differences in the observed and unobserved characteristics of their workforce, a 
potential gap in wages between family and non-family firms may also occur because the same 
worker is paid differently in firms with different ownership statuses, to the extent that they do 
not apply the same wage policy. In order to estimate this effect, controlling also for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity across workers, we estimate the following long-difference 
equation on the sub-sample of workers who do not change establishment over the period:  
  ij j i j ij u Z X F w + β ∆ + α ∆ + ∆ γ = ∆log     (4) 
where  ij w log ∆   denotes  the change in the gross hourly wage of worker i  continuously 
employed in establishment j between 1998 and 2004.  j F ∆  is the change in ownership over 
the period,  i X ∆  and  j Z ∆  are two sets of time-varying individual and establishment controls, 
respectively, and u is the error term. Of course, correctly estimating equation (4) requires 
taking into account the potential selection of workers into firms.  
 
1.2 Job security 
As a second step, we investigate whether family firms offer a specific compensation package 
including more job security. We first estimate the relationship between family ownership and 
different types of separation rates. In our data, separation rates are available for each quarter 
over 1997-2007 whereas family ownership, establishment and firm-level controls are 




j Z F S ε + β + γ =
. Some types of separations, 
including dismissals, fluctuate quite a lot over time and are 0 in a number of quarters. This is 
why we average them over a rather long period of time roughly corresponding to an entire 
cycle (2001-2007) centred on the year for which we have ownership status for most 
establishments. The model we estimate is then the following: 
      (5) 
                                                 
6 And, for a subsample of establishments, for 1998.   9 
where 
a
j S  is the average separation rate of type a (dismissal, voluntary quit, retirement, end of 
trial period and end of fixed-term contract), in establishment j over 2001-2007,  j F is our 





j u Z F S + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ β γ
 As we try to establish some statements concerning job security, our main 
interest is on dismissal rates. Nevertheless, it is important  to look also at other types of 
separations in order to make sure that a lower  level of one type of separation is not 
compensated by a higher level of another type.  
Here again, our results could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity across establishments. In 
order to overcome this problem, we re-estimate equation (5) in long differences on the 
subsample of establishments for which we have ownership data both in 1998 and 2004. In 
order to do so in a meaningful way, we re-compute average separation rates over shorter 
periods (3 years) centred on years for which we have ownership status. In practice, we 
estimate: 
      (6) 
where 
a
j S ∆  is the change in the separation rate of type a in establishment j between 1997-
1999 and 2003-2005,  j F ∆  is the change in ownership over the period and  j Z ∆  denotes time-
varying establishment controls. 
A particularly important issue for the job security of incumbent workers is the behaviour of 
their employer when a negative shock forces her to destroy jobs. In such case, there is clearly 
a greater risk that the positions of incumbent workers be suppressed independently of the 
effort they pay in their job. So, we estimate whether, when family firms are hit by a negative 
shock and downsize, they rely more or less on dismissals than non-family firms do under the 
same circumstances. We do so by looking at the sensitivity of establishment-level dismissals 
to establishment-level job creation and destruction and testing whether this sensitivity differs 
between family and non-family firms. However, other establishment-level characteristics are 
likely to affect this sensitivity (notably establishment age) and we need to control for them in 
our estimates. Our model is the following: 
  jt j t jt j jt j jt D JDR JCR DR ε µ α α + + + + = 2 1     (7) 
                                                 
7 We also conduct robustness checks on a shorter time period around the year for which ownership information 
is available (2003-2005).    10 
where  jt DR  is the dismissal rate in establishment j at quarter t,  jt JCR  (resp.  jt JDR ) is the 
job creation (resp. destruction) rate, Dt is a time dummy and  j µ  is an establishment fixed 
effect, which allows us to take into account that dismissal rates are persistently different 
across establishments.
8
jt JCR  The coefficients of   (resp.  jt JDR ) are assumed to vary across 
establishments according to the following model: 
 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
β + γ + α = α





    (8) 
where  j F  and  j Z  are defined as for equation (5) and refer to 2004. Plugging equation (8) into 
equation (7) yields the final regression that we estimate: 
jt j t jt j jt j jt j jt j jt jt jt D JDR Z JCR Z JDR F JCR F JDR JCR DR ε + µ + + β + β + γ + γ + α + α = 2 1 2 1 2 1
  (9) 
A negative coefficient on the  j jtF JDR  interaction term would suggest that family firms rely 
less on dismissals than non-family firms when they downsize. However, when firms are hit by 
a negative shock and have to downsize, the frontier between dismissals and quits may be 
somewhat blurred, insofar as firms may put pressure on workers so that they quit, either 
directly or by cutting their wage and worsening their working conditions. As a consequence, 
we also want to check that the estimated pattern for dismissals is not compensated by an 
opposite one for quits. In order to do so, we re-estimate the model of equation (9) using quits 
as a dependent variable. If family firms rely less on dismissals when hit by a negative shock, 
it must be the case that they make the necessary adjustment by compressing hiring. We check 
this by re-running our estimates with hiring as a dependent variable, as well. 
Finally, another key aspect of job security as part of a compensation package is whether 
workers in family firms effectively feel that they have a smaller risk of losing their job. For 
the year 2004 and a subset of workers, we dispose of data on self-reported perceptions of the 
future risk of job loss. For those workers, we estimate the cross-sectional relationship between 
family ownership and the perceived risk of dismissal. The basic specification is equivalent to 
equation (1): 
  ij j i j ij Z X F RD ε + β + α + γ =     (10) 
                                                 
8 Here again, we take a relatively large time window (2001-2007), centred on the year for which we have 
ownership status for most establishments (2004).    11 
where  ij RD  is the risk of dismissal perceived by worker i employed in establishment j.  
 
2. The data 
The data we use come from several data sources as it is necessary to combine information on 
wages, firm ownership, worker flows, employees' characteristics, as well as a wide array of 
firms' and/or establishments' characteristics.  
The first data source that we use is the 2004 wave of the REPONSE survey (RElations 
PrOfessionnelles et NégocationS d’Entreprise, which was also conducted in France in 1992 
and 1998). To our knowledge, it is one of the very few databases that include information on 
ownership status of companies that are both listed and not listed on the stock market. In 2004, 
a representative sample of 2,930 establishments with at least 20 employees was surveyed. 
Questions about firm ownership,  the use of information and communication  technologies 
(ICT) and innovative managerial practices, as well as establishment characteristics were asked 
to one top  manager per establishment. Regarding firm ownership, the manager is asked: 
"What is the type of the main category of shareholder of the firm?" According to the answer, 
we group firms into two main categories: those with family ownership (the main shareholder 
is  either  a family or an individual) and those with non-family ownership (i.e. for which 
ownership is either dispersed or private equity or which are joint-ventures). Other categories 
are charities, associations and governmental organisations operating in the business sector, as 
well as firms owned by their own workers, by  the government or by other types of 
shareholders. We define a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the firm is owned by a 
family or an individual and 0 otherwise. We will call it “family ownership” or “family firm” 
hereafter. With this definition of family ownership, family firms account for 58.2% of the 
total number of firms in our sample. Our definition of family ownership is very close to that 
of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) for whom a firm is family owned if the top manager who is 
interviewed reports that the largest shareholder is either the founder or family members who 
are second generation or beyond. Using this definition, they find a proportion of family firms 
in France of 56%, out of which 26% are founder-owned and 30% are owned by second 
generation (or beyond) family members.  Both Bloom and Van Reenen's and our sample 
include non-listed along with listed companies. By contrast, Sraer and Thesmar (2007), who 
only focus on a restricted sample of French listed firms, use a different definition of family 
ownership: a firm is family-owned if the family or a member has more than 20% of the voting   12 
rights. This definition of family firms on the basis of ultimate ownership is frequent in the 
literature on listed companies –  see Faccio  and Lang  (2002). However, data  on ultimate 
ownership are not available in a reliable form for non-listed companies whatever the country 
– see for example Bianco et al. (2009) for Italy. This is why we rely on the information on the 
main type of shareholder provided by the top manager interviewed in the REPONSE survey
9
To the extent that we are interested in contrasting compensation packages between family 
firms on the one hand and widely-held, private equity or joint-venture companies on the other 




REPONSE also provides information on the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) and innovative managerial practices. Managers are asked what proportion 
of the employees use computers, the Internet or the Intranet. For each of these new 
technologies, the answer is coded from 0 to 4 with 0 corresponding to "nobody", 1 to "less 
than 5%", 2 to "5-19%", 3 to "20 to 49%" and 4 to "50% and more". Our ICT variable is 
defined as the sum of the answers over the three types of technologies. It thus captures the 
intensity of use of ICT at the establishment level and varies between 0 and 12. We standardise 
it to 0 mean and 1 standard deviation. As regards innovative managerial practices, we build a 
summary index along the lines suggested by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In the 
REPONSE survey we have information on the proportion of workers involved in performance 
dialogue (expression groups, shopfloor meetings, quality circles), the number of devices 
designed to stimulate workers' participation (firm project, seminars, firm newspaper, open 
day, suggestion box, satisfaction survey), whether workers are autonomous in handling tasks 
and whether their work is defined in terms of goal to reach rather than in terms of precise 
actions. Managers are also asked the number of areas in which quantitative targets exist 
(financial return, budget, cost, quality, growth, security), whether there exist a training 
scheme, individual or collective  wage incentive schemes  (both for managers and non-
managers),  evaluations of individual workers  and whether  the  assessment  of employees' 
performance has any impact on wages or promotions. We build one variable out of the answer 
given for each item – see the Data Appendix for more details. Our summary index is then 
defined as the weighted sum of each of these variables so that they equally contribute to the 
  
                                                 
9 Let us underline that, despite the difference in the definition of ownership and the period of analysis, out of the 
65 firms which are common to Sraer and Thesmar's and our datasets, the answer about ownership is identical for 
54 firms (i.e. 82% of the total). 
10 In this sample the proportion of establishments belonging to a family firm is 51% – see Appendix Table A1.   13 
overall index
11
Finally, the REPONSE dataset provides information on establishment size, age, the presence 
of a union representative in the establishment and whether or not it is (or it belongs to a group 
which is) listed on the stock market. As can be seen from Appendix Table A1, establishments 
in family firms are, on average, smaller than in non-family ones
. One interesting point is that family firms appear to be much less innovative 
than non-family ones both in terms of ICT and in terms of managerial practices  (see 
Appendix Table A1). 
12
Information on labour productivity (defined as valued added per worker at the firm level) 
comes from the DIANE database which contains publicly-available company accounts
, they are less likely to 
belong to a firm that is listed on the stock market and union representatives are much less 
frequent than in non-family firms. 
13
The REPONSE and DIANE datasets have been matched with Social Security records 
(Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales, DADS). These contain information on gross 
hourly wages (constructed as gross annual wages divided by the number of hours worked), 
gender, age, occupation, working full time or part-time, and a rough measure of job tenure
. As 
shown in Table A1, labour productivity is substantially lower in family firms as compared to 
non-family ones. We also draw from DIANE information on profitability and firm age. 
14 
for nearly all workers in the French private sector. Matching the DADS files with REPONSE 
and DIANE leaves us with 511,230 employees working in 1,995 establishments of whom 
35% are employed in family-owned establishments and 65% in non-family establishments. 
Such a design generates linked employer-employee information, which allows us to study 
individual compensation taking into account both firm and worker heterogeneity on 
observable characteristics.  As usually done with the DADS and  to eliminate implausible 
values of hourly wages due to misreporting of either annual wages or hours worked, we drop 
the lowest and highest percentile of the hourly wage distribution
15
                                                 
11 Here again, we standardise the index to 0 mean and 1 standard deviation.  
12 Let us underline that despite this difference in average size between family and non very firms, the size 
distributions of both groups overlap to a very large extent. 
13 It is provided by Bureau van Dijk, a private consulting company, and it is the French source file for the more 
famous Amadeus database. 
14 We know whether workers have tenure less than one year, between one and two years, or more than two years.  
15 See Abowd et al (1999b). Our results are nonetheless robust to the inclusion of these extreme hourly wages.  
. We also exclude CEOs 
and top executives. As evidenced in Appendix Table A2, in 2004, family establishments paid 
on average lower wages, employed more women and fewer highly-skilled workers (managers 
and technicians) than non-family establishments. In contrast, average age and tenure as well   14 
as part-time work were very similar in both types of firms. Information about individual 
workers is also provided by the REPONSE survey. In  2004, for  each establishment,  on 
average 4 workers answered a written questionnaire. They were randomly drawn out of the 
group of workers with more than 15 months of tenure. They were asked questions about their 
job, and in particular the risk they perceive of losing it in the next 12 months. Using this 
information, we build a variable capturing the perceived risk of dismissal which takes values 
1 to 4 when the risk is perceived as being respectively "zero", "low", "high" and "very high".  
The REPONSE survey has a panel subsample which provides information on establishments 
in 1998 and 2004 by means of the manager questionnaire. It contains 481 establishments for 
which we have data on family ownership at both dates. We match it with the DADS panel for 
which we have yearly data from 1994 to 2006. This panel covers 1/12
th of all workers in 2004 
and 1/24
th in 1998 and enables us to follow workers from one year to the next. In 1998, 4,713 
workers from the DADS panel are employed in one of the REPONSE establishments. About 
2/3rds of these workers still were in the same establishment in 2004 whereas 1/3
rd had left – 
usually to establishments outside the REPONSE panel.  The information  available  in the 
DADS panel  is similar to the DADS cross section except for job  tenure which is more 
detailed (so that we are able to code it into 8 categories instead of 3). Changes in family 
ownership are captured through a variable defined as family ownership in 2004 minus family 
ownership in 1998. This variable may thus take values 0 (no change in ownership), +1 
(family-owned in 2004 while it was not in 1998) and -1 (family-owned in 1998 while not 
anymore in 2004). On average, it is equal to 0.017 in our sample. But the proportion of firms 
changing ownership whatever the direction is much higher: 17% over the period, with about 
half of the changes taking place in each direction  –  see Appendix Table A3 for more 
descriptive statistics on changes in individual and establishment characteristics. 
The last source that we use is the DMMO/  EMMO database. In principle, the DMMO 
(Données sur les Mouvements de Main-d’Oeuvre) has exhaustive quarterly  data on gross 
worker flows (hirings and separations, excluding temporary help workers) for establishments 
with 50 employees or more. The data is broken down by type of flow. The EMMO (Enquête 
sur les Mouvements de Main-d’Oeuvre) has identical information on a representative sample 
of establishments with less than 50 employees. We match the DMMO and EMMO datasets 
with REPONSE 2004 and we are left with 1,803 establishments reporting information both on 
job and worker flows and on ownership. We use the DMMO-EMMO data  to compute 
indicators  of job security and, more specifically, of hiring and separation  rates at the   15 
establishment level. In order to do that, we drop all movements corresponding to job spells 
shorter than one month. These indeed correspond to very short trial periods or short-term 
contracts which have little to do with job security for core workers
16. We also exclude 
movements due to transfers between two establishments of the same firm. Our data allows us 
to build hiring and separation rates for each quarter over 2001-2007.
17 As standard in the 
gross worker flow literature (Davis et al, 2006), the hiring rate is defined as the ratio of all 
hires during a given quarter to the average employment level of that quarter
18  and the 
separation rate as the sum of all types of separations
19
Estimates from cross-sectional individual wage equations suggest that average gross hourly 
wages  are lower in family than in non-family firms (see Table 1). The simple bivariate 
correlation between family ownership and wages – see column (1) – indicates that wages are 
about 20% lower in family firms than in non family ones. Not surprisingly, the family wage 
penalty is much smaller when we include standard establishment controls – establishment size 
and age, presence of a union representative, being listed on the stock market, 10 regional and 
 divided by average employment. In 
order to go deeper into the types of separations, we define dismissal rates, quit rates, 
retirement rates, rates of end of trial periods and rates of end of fixed-term contracts as the 
ratio of the corresponding type of movement during the quarter to the average employment of 
the quarter. Following the gross job flow literature (Davis et al., 1997), we also define the job 
creation rate as the net growth rate of employment in the establishment between the beginning 
and the end of the quarter when it is positive  and 0 otherwise. Symmetrically, the job 
destruction rate is the absolute value of the net growth rate of employment when it is 




3.1 Wages in family firms 
3.1.1 Family firms pay lower wages 
                                                 
16 Our results are nonetheless robust to the inclusion of these very short job spells. 
17 2001-2007 is our main sample. We also have data going back to 1997, which allows us to construct quarterly 
separation rates for two other sub-periods: 1997-1999 and 2003-2005 on which we estimate our long difference 
specification – see Section 1. 
18 The average employment level of the quarter is defined as half of the sum of the employment levels at the 
beginning and the end of the quarter (see e.g. Davis et al., 2006).  
19 In the original data, separations are classified as due to dismissals, quits, retirement and early retirement, end 
of trial periods, end of fixed-term contracts, military service, injuries, death or separations for unknown reason.    16 
2-digit industry dummies – and workforce characteristics (i.e. occupation, gender, age, job 
tenure  and  part-time/full-time status).  Nonetheless, when including all  these  controls, the 
wage gap between family and non-family firms still amounts to about 4%, and is significant at 
the 1% level – see column (2). This suggests that this wage gap cannot be entirely explained 
by the fact that family businesses are overrepresented in specific industries, employ a larger 
share of unskilled workers and are less unionised – see Sraer and Thesmar (2007), Mueller 
and Philippon (2011) and our descriptive statistics in Appendix Table A1. Interestingly, all 
our results also hold if we exclude all managers from the sample, suggesting that the wage 
gap we detect is not limited to managerial occupations – see Appendix Table A5. 
One could be concerned that these results might be driven by the fact that family firms 
employ family members who benefit from non-wage earnings and are, in turn, paid lower 
wages. If this were the case, our results would be driven by small establishments, since family 
members are unlikely to represent a large fraction of the workforce in large firms. In order to 
check that our results are robust to the elimination of smaller establishments, we re-run our 
regressions on establishments with more than 50 workers. Our findings are virtually 
unchanged, thus suggesting that earnings of family members do not account for a major part 
of the family/non-family wage gap that we find. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) find that family firms are less innovative – and hence less 
productive – than non-family ones. We find similar evidence in our data using indicators 
constructed in the same way as theirs (see Section 2).
20 When controlling for intensity of ICT 
use and innovative managerial practices in the wage regression, the coefficient on family 
firms decreases to 2.4% but remains significant at the 1% level (Table 1, Column 3). Not 
surprisingly, similar results hold if we control directly for  firm-level labour productivity 
(Table 1, Column 4).
21
Results in Table 1 could also be driven by other sources of heterogeneity across firms that we 
are unable to observe directly.  In Table 2  we  use  the REPONSE and DADS panels to 
investigate this issue and re-estimate our wage equation on the subsample of establishments 
(and employees), for which we have ownership data in both 1998 and 2004. We include 
 
                                                 
20  Even controlling for workforce characteristics and standard establishment controls, family-owned 
establishments have on average lower indicators of ICT use and innovative managerial practices than 
establishments whose ownership is mainly widely held, private equity or joint ventures. As a consequence 
family firms are less productive, – see the longer version of this paper (Bassanini et al, 2011). 
21 The comparison of Columns 3 and 4 suggests that controlling for ICT and managerial practices is equivalent 
to control for firm-level productivity, consistent with the fact that the productivity gap between family and non-
family firms disappears once ICT and managerial practices are included. In the remainder of the paper we show 
results controlling for the latter indicators but all results are qualitatively similar if we control for productivity.   17 
establishment fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The results 
from this exercise point to a larger wage gap than in the simple cross-section without fixed 
effects (Table 2, Column 1). When family firms change to non-family ownership (i.e. the 
family firm indicator shifts from 1 to 0), our results show that their average wages grow by 
4.9% and this pay increase is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, this result does not appear 
to be due to specificities of the pooled sample that we use. If we re-estimate our baseline 
equation on this sample without fixed effects, we find a wage gap quite close to that found in 
the larger cross-sectional sample for 2004 (see Table A6 in the Appendix).
22
As our results are identified through changes in family ownership, we might ask whether the 
direction of the transition matters: are changes from family to non-family ownership 
associated with an increase in wages as large as the decrease in wages observed when a non-
family firm is sold to a family? We can investigate this issue by including an interaction 
between the family firm indicator and a time-invariant dummy that takes value 1 in both years 
if the firm was family-owned in 1998 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of this interaction term 
turns out to be close to 0 and insignificant (Table 2, Column 2), suggesting that the effect of 
changes in family ownership is symmetric.
  
23
Perhaps more important, we also worry that changes in family ownership may be endogenous, 
which can be problematic because we do not dispose of a suitable instrument. In particular, 
we expect specific shocks and/or different stages in the firm’s lifecycle to be correlated with 
the  probability of changing main shareholder.  We  worry  that  some  unobserved factors 
associated to these shocks or lifecycle  stages might determine the correlation between 
changes in family ownership and changes in wages that we observe in Table 2. However, in 
order to bias our results, these unobserved factors should  affect differently changes  in 
ownership status depending on the direction of the transition (from family to non-family and 
vice versa). If this were to occur, we would expect that a number of key firm characteristics, 
  
                                                 
22 This suggests that there are unobserved establishment-level characteristics that are positively correlated with 
family ownership and wages. One possible candidate is the fact that family firms are able to more credibly 
commit to long-term relationships, which facilitates investments in match-specific capital. In turn, higher match-
specific capital is partially reflected in wages. Insofar as this capital takes time to build and is not immediately 
destroyed when a change of ownership status occurs, it can be considered to be approximately time-invariant in 
our pooled sample. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that wage-tenure profiles are more upward-sloped in 
family than in non-family firms: if we estimate equation (1) separately on the samples of family and non-family 
firms, controlling for the full set of other covariates considered in Table 1, in family firms employees with job 
tenure greater than 20 years earn on average 16% more than those with less than one year as compared to only 
7% more in non-family firms. 
23 This interaction term takes the same values in 1998 and 2004 except when the firm was non-family owned in 
2004 and family owned in 1998. Once added to the specification, its coefficient thus identifies the difference 
between the effect of changes from non-family to family-ownership and that of changes from family to non-
family ownership.   18 
which are likely to be correlated with these shocks or stages in the firm's life cycle (such as 
firm age and pre-change levels and growth of profitability, productivity, size, and wages), 
should  differ systematically according to the direction of the transition and therefore be 
correlated with changes in family ownership.
24 We do not find any such evidence (see Table 
A7 in the Appendix).
25,26
A natural explanation of the change in average wages following a change in family ownership 
– that we find in Table 2 - is that workers are different in family and non-family firms. 
Although the specification in Table 2 controls for observable workers' characteristics, workers 
may differ with respect to unobservables.  Given that non-family firms tend to be more 
innovative and more productive than family firms, they may attract more dynamic workers. If 
this is the case, part of the wage difference estimated in Table 2 may be due to an assortative 
 Although we need to be very cautious in interpreting our results, 
this finding is reassuring and suggests that the timing of specific shocks, by affecting in the 
same way transitions from family to non-family firms and vice versa, is unlikely to bias the 
coefficient of the family firm indicator in Table 2.  
Overall, our results suggest that changes in family ownership generate changes in average 
wages of about 5% and that this effect is symmetric whatever the direction of the change. At 
this point, an important question is whether this change in average wages is due to the fact 
that workers in family and non-family firms have different unobservable characteristics, or 
whether it is due to a change in the firm wage policy such that the same workers are paid in a 
different way in family and non-family firms.  
 
3.1.2 Assortative matching vs changes in stayers' wages 
                                                 
24 We make here the assumption that unobserved factors affecting ownership changes are reflected in some key 
observable characteristics of the firm. Although debatable, this assumption is typically made in difference-in-
difference estimations when balancing tests between treatment and comparison groups are used to validate the 
identification strategy (see for example the discussion in Altonji et al., 2005). 
25 We obtain similar results to those presented in Table A7 if we restrict the sample by excluding firms not 
changing ownership. 
26 By contrast, as expected, we find that firms changing main shareholder (whatever its type) between 1998 and 
2004 differ from other firms on a number of characteristics. More precisely, we do not dispose of information on 
all changes of main shareholder but we can construct a variable that takes value 1 every time the main 
shareholder changes type (in practice, change in main-shareholder type is equal to the absolute value of change 
in family ownership). Correlating this variable with several firm and establishment characteristics, we find that 
firms changing main shareholder type between 1998 and 2004 were on average significantly younger than other 
firms  (results available from the authors upon request). In addition,  they  also  had  on average 18% greater 
employment growth in 1994-1998. However, insofar as in our sample there are an almost equal number of 
transitions from family to non-family ownership and vice versa, changes in main-shareholder type and changes 
in family ownership are uncorrelated. Therefore, establishing that firms changing main-shareholder type have 
specific characteristics has no implication for the correlation between changes in the family ownership indicator 
and these firm characteristics.   19 
matching mechanism rather than to the "true" impact of a change in wage policy brought 
about by the change in family ownership.  
In order to investigate this issue we estimate whether workers who left a firm that changed 
family ownership between 1998 and 2004 had different wages  from stayers’  before the 
change took place (i.e. in 1998) – see equation (2). Symmetrically, we also estimate whether 
workers who arrive in a firm that changed ownership have different wage levels as of 2004 as 
compared to workers who have been continuously employed in the establishment between 
1998 and 2004 – see equation (3). Results in Table 3 col (1) suggest that leavers are actually 
different from stayers: when a firm changes from non-family to family ownership (∆Family 
firm = 1), the difference in 1998 wages between workers who leave the firm and those who 
eventually stay turn out to be, on average, 6.5% higher than in firms not changing ownership. 
Similarly, the opposite occurs when a firm changes ownership from family to non-family. 
This result supports the idea that workers in non-family firms (resp. family firms) are "high-
wage" (resp. "low-wage") individuals – after controlling for observable characteristics – and 
that assortative matching is taking place, with a number of these workers leaving the firm 
when it switches from non-family to family (resp. from family to non-family) ownership.
27
                                                 
27 We check that if the coefficients of the interaction between Leaver and ∆Family firm are allowed to depend on 
the direction of the ownership transition, their difference is statistically insignificant, so that we can claim that 
the sorting patterns are effectively symmetric. 
 In 
contrast, we do not find any evidence of selection on arrivers: as shown in Table 3 col (2), the 
wage difference between arrivers and stayers  is  virtually identical whether firms change 
family ownership or not. This result is consistent with assortative matching to the extent that 
once poorly matched workers have left  following  the change in ownership, stayers are 
presumably properly matched and hence have no reason to be different from newly hired 
workers who have been chosen because they match the firm's needs (and/or characteristics).  
So, part of the variation in wages we observe when firms change family ownership is due to a 
change in the unobservable composition of their workforce. However, a 6.5% wage difference 
over a population of leavers who represents about 1/3
rd of the total workforce (see Section 2) 
cannot fully account for the overall 5% wage change that we estimate when firms change 
family ownership. This suggests that some of the workers – those who tend to remain in the 
firm after a change in ownership – are likely to be paid differently in family and non-family 
firms because of different firm wage policies.    20 
In order to quantify this effect, we estimate the impact of changes in family ownership on 
wage growth for workers who have been continuously employed in the same establishment 
between 1998 and 2004 – see equation (4). According to the results in Table 4 – Column 1, 
workers who stay in the same establishment when firm ownership changes do experience a 
change in their wage: when firms switch from non-family to family ownership (∆Family firm 
= 1), stayers' wages go down by about 3.2% and vice versa when family ownership changes in 
the opposite direction. Yet, given the existence of assortative matching of workers and firms, 
one could be worried that our sample of stayers is selected at least on some dimensions, 
which would  generate biases in the estimation of equation (4). However, while workers 
leaving firms that change family ownership differ from stayers because of some  specific 
unobserved characteristics correlated with their wage level in 1998 (see Table 3), they have 
no different wage growth either before (1994-1998) or after the ownership change (2004-
2006)
28 – see Table A8, Columns 1 and 2, in the Appendix.
29
Given that selection of workers into firms seems to be only driven by unobserved 
characteristics correlated with 1998 wage levels, we use a proxy-variable approach to further 
check that selectivity is not driving our results.  More specifically, we proxy these 
unobservables by the relative wage of the individual in 1998 defined as the individual wage 
divided by the average wage in her establishment computed on all individuals, will they be 
stayers or leavers in the next period.
 This suggests that the observed 
sorting of workers into family and non-family firms is essentially driven by differences in 
unobserved characteristics that are likely to be time-invariant (such as individual productive 
ability) and, therefore, will be differenced out when estimating equation (4). In other words, 
we do not expect our estimates in Table 4 – Column 1 – to be significantly biased because of 
sample selection. However, we check that this is actually the case by running a couple of 
robustness checks.   
30 Including this variable in the regression leaves our 
results unchanged – see Table 4, Column 2 – thereby supporting the idea that selectivity is not 
a major concern in our estimates.
31
                                                 
28 1994 is the first year and 2006 is the last year for which we have access to comparable wage data. 
29 Specifications estimated in Table A8 - cols (1) and (2) – are based on equation (2) except that the dependent 
variables and the individual controls are differences over 1994-1998 and 2004-2006. 
30 This procedure appears to be justified by the fact that stayers and leavers do not appear to differ with respect to 
other characteristics in 1998 (such as age, gender, occupation, job tenure and full-time/part-time status – see 
Table A8, Columns (3) to (7), which suggests that the selection pattern is essentially determined by 
unobservables that are closely associated to the wage level (such as individual ability). 
  
31 An alternative way to deal with the issue of selectivity is the following. Given that “high-wage” workers leave 
non-family firms when they become family-owned and that “low-wage” workers do so when the change in   21 
To the extent that only 17% of firms change ownership in our sample between 1998 and 
2004, one could be concerned that the absence of conditional correlation that we find between 
relative wages in 1998 and subsequent wage growth might be driven by firms that did not 
change family ownership. In order to control for this, we re-run our estimates on the 
subsample of establishments that did change family ownership over the period. Results in 
Table 4 – Columns 3 and 4 – suggest that this is not a concern: the estimates are virtually 
identical to those computed on the whole sample.  
Overall, family firms appear to pay lower wages. Part of the wage gap is due to differences in 
unobserved characteristics of workers across family and non-family firms. But part of it is 
also due to different wage policies being implemented by these  firms, so that the same 
worker’s pay is different in family and non-family companies, at least for those who tend to 
stay in the firm after a change in ownership. The finding that ownership type is associated 
with  differences in wage policies raises the issue  of whether it may also affect other 
components of the compensation package. Job security is one of the most important ones.  
 
3.2 Job security in family firms 
In this section we investigate whether family firms offer greater job security than their non-
family counterparts. If so, this would point to a different compensation package offered by 
family firms characterised by lower wages but greater job security.  
 
3.2.1 Average separation rates 
A first way to look at job security in family firms is to consider separation rates and, more 
specifically, rates of dismissals which capture the risk of job loss for permanent workers. We 
use 2001-2007 averages to avoid that our results be affected by a large number of zeros in the 
case of certain separations (notably dismissals – see Section 2). Results in Table 5 – Column 
1 – show that dismissal rates are significantly lower in family firms even after controlling for 
our basic set of establishment and worker controls, including ICT and managerial practices 
                                                                                                                                                          
ownership goes in the opposite direction, one may try to identify a sort of “common support”. By excluding the 
top and bottom deciles of the relative wage distribution (dated 1998), we define a "restricted" sample of workers. 
We check that, on this sample, there is no evidence of selection – that is, that the δ parameter in equation (2) is 
not significantly different from zero. We then re-estimate equation (4) on this restricted subsample. Results 
provided in Table A9 show that the coefficient on the ∆Family Firm variable is not statistically different from 
the one we find in Table 4. Here again, this suggests that selectivity is unlikely to be a major issue in our results.    22 
and industry dummies.
32
However, specifications in Table 5 do not control for the proportion of permanent workers in 
the establishment. This may be a problem since external flexibility in family firms might be 
ensured by fixed-term contracts. As involuntary separations at the end of a fixed-term contract 
are not reported as dismissals in the data
 The difference in dismissal rates between family and non-family 
firms is estimated to be as large as 0.15 percentage point per quarter, which amounts to a 28% 
gap between both types of firms (cf. Table A4). This suggests that the risk of involuntary job 
loss is substantially lower in family than in non-family firms. One interesting point is that the 
low level of dismissals is not compensated for by other types of separations – see Columns 2 
to 5: family firms do not display higher levels of quits, retirement, end of trial periods or end 
of fixed-term contracts. 
33 this may create a bias in our estimates. In principle, 
given the small share of workers on fixed-term contracts in our sample, this should not be a 
major problem.
34 Nevertheless, in order to deal with this problem, Appendix Table A10 – 
Column 1 – re-estimates the dismissal equation controlling for the proportion of permanent 
workers in the establishment in 2004, drawn from the REPONSE dataset.
35
Of course, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across establishments could be driving 
our results. In order to deal with this issue, we re-estimate our model in long differences 
between 1998 and 2004 – see Table 6. The results are very similar to those in Table 5 with 
changes from non-family to family ownership (∆F = 1) inducing a reduction in the rate of 
dismissals.  Let us underline that this result is unlikely to be driven by changes in the 
unobserved composition of the workforce. As evidenced in section 3.1.2, in the case of a 
transition from non-family to family ownership, workers who stay in the establishment have 
worse productive abilities than those who left. To the extent that these workers have greater 
propensity to be dismissed, this is likely to bias our estimates towards zero, if anything. 
 The results are 
very similar to those in Table 5. Family firms still display lower rates of dismissals. Given 
that our information on firm ownership is for 2004, a further robustness check consists in 
reducing our sample  to  dismissals  taking place in 2003-2005, i.e. a short period of time 
centred  around the date for which we  have information on ownership. Family firms still 
display lower dismissal rates – see Table A10, Column 2.  
                                                 
32  The DMMO-EMMO files do not report these firm characteristics, which are therefore drawn from the 
REPONSE survey and thus refer to 2004. 
33 They are simply classified as separations due to end of contract.  
34 Workers on fixed-term contracts amount, on average, to 5% of the workforce in our sample. 
35 Information on the share of workers on fixed-term contracts is neither available in the DMMO-EMMO nor in 
the DADS datasets. As a consequence, we do not dispose of a time series for this share.   23 
Finally, as discussed when estimating our wage equation including establishment fixed 
effects, we do not find any evidence of unobserved factors affecting differently ownership 
changes depending on the direction of the transition (from family to non-family and vice 
versa). Observable characteristics of firms are indeed uncorrelated with ∆Family Firm – see 
Table A7 – so that we believe it is unlikely that selectivity be a major driver of our estimates.  
 
3.2.2 Downsizing through dismissals or hiring reductions? 
As a second step, we investigate whether family firms rely less on dismissals than non-family 
firms do when they downsize. This is indeed a crucial issue for incumbent workers: when a 
firm downsizes, they have a greater chance to lose their job independently of their effort. Do 
they face a lower risk of job loss when the firm is hit by a negative shock, if employed in a 
family firm? In order to shed light on this point, we regress dismissal rates on job creation and 
job destruction rates as well as their interaction with family ownership – see equation (9). As 
evidenced in Table 7 – Panel A, job destruction rates are strongly correlated with dismissals, 
even controlling for establishment heterogeneity in separations through establishment fixed-
effects – see Column 1.
36
One concern about these results is that establishments with different size, age etc., operating 
in different sectors or with different workers' characteristics could react in a different way to 
job creation or job destruction which could be confounded with the effect of family 
ownership. In  order to control for this, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 –  Panels A and B 
progressively include interaction terms between job creation and job destruction on the one 
 When comparing adjustment patterns in family and non family 
firms – see Column 2 – family firms appear to rely less than non-family ones on dismissals 
when employment contracts: the coefficient on the interaction between family ownership and 
the job destruction rate is negative and significant. A consistent finding emerges when we use 
the hiring rate as dependent variable. Column 2 in Panel B of Table 7 shows a negative and 
significant coefficient on the interaction between family ownership and the job destruction 
rate even in this case. As a consequence, when facing a negative shock, family firms tend to 
achieve the required staff adjustment by reducing hiring more and by increasing dismissals 
less than non-family firms do. 
                                                 
36 As regards the adjustment to job creation, the positive coefficient on the JCR variable in Table 7 might suggest 
that dismissals increase with employment expansion – although this effect is substantially smaller for family 
firms as indicated by the negative coefficients on the interaction between family ownership and job creation. 
This is consistent with previous evidence for France (see Abowd et al, 1999a). It is probably due to the fact that, 
when expanding, non-family firms make a lot of experimentation with new recruits which generates many hiring 
and separations of workers that stay with the firm only for a short period of time (see Jovanovic, 1979, and Pries 
and Rogerson, 2005).   24 
hand and these potentially confounding factors on the other hand. Our main result is robust to 
these changes: family firms consistently appear to rely less on dismissals and to compress 
hiring more when hit by a negative shock. 
 
3.2.3 Subjective data on job security 
The fact that family firms offer greater job security is confirmed by subjective data. In Table 
8, we use the information, available in the employee section of the 2004 REPONSE survey, 
on  the risk perceived by workers  of loosing their job in the next 12 months
37
 
.  More 
specifically, we regress the perceived risk of dismissal on family ownership using a 
specification identical to the one elicited for wages. As evidenced in Column 1, workers in 
family firms perceive a lower risk of dismissal even after controlling for establishment and 
worker characteristics. In order to better control for unobserved heterogeneity across workers, 
Column 2 adds the individual wage to the previous specification. The results are virtually 
unchanged: the risk of dismissal perceived by workers remains lower in family firms.  
Overall, our results suggest that family firms do provide more job security to incumbent 
workers: not only do they have lower average dismissal rates but, when employment goes 
down, they also reduce hiring more than non-family firms do and consistently, they rely less 
on dismissals. Workers are aware of this difference in firms' behaviour, with those employed 
in family firms reporting significantly lower perceived risk of dismissal. 
 
3.3 Compensating wage differential 
Our results on stayers' wages, on the one hand, and job security, on the other hand, raise the 
issue of a possible compensation between pay and job security. If workers who stay in an 
establishment which changes from non-family to family ownership experience a reduction in 
wages, to what extent can this change in pay be explained by a compensating wage 
differential mechanism, whereby workers would accept lower wages in exchange for greater 
job security? Similarly, in the event of a transition from family to non-family ownership, to 
what extent does the wage increase act as a compensation for reduced job security?  
In order to provide evidence on this point, one would estimate:  
ij j i j j ij u Z X D F w + β ∆ + α ∆ + ∆ δ + ∆ γ = ∆log     (11) 
                                                 
37 This perceived risk may be "very high", "high", "low" or "zero". From these responses, we construct an 
indicator which varies between 1 and 4 that we treat as a cardinal variable. Nevertheless, we also estimate 
ordered probit models where this variable is treated as ordinal only with similar results.    25 
in which the variables are the same as in equation (4) with ∆Dj denoting the change in the rate 
of dismissal in establishment j  between 1998 and 2004. In this set-up, the prediction 
associated with compensating wage differential is that δˆshould be positive and γˆ should go 
down to zero – with ^ indicating estimates. Any increase in the rate of dismissal should 
indeed be matched by a corresponding increase in log wages. In addition, if changes in 
stayers' wages are entirely due to changes in dismissals brought about by changes in family 
ownership, the coefficient on ∆F should be found close to zero when estimating equation 
(11). 
One problem is that ∆D is endogenous and OLS  estimates of δ  are likely to be biased 
downwards. This is because any negative shock affecting the establishment is likely to induce 
at the same time an increase in dismissals and a reduction in wages. As a matter of fact, when 
estimating equation (11) on our whole sample, the coefficient on ∆D  turns out to be 
insignificant and very close to zero – see Table 9, Column 1 – while that on ∆F remains 
unchanged. Now, suppose that the firm wage policy changes only when there is a change in 
family ownership. Then, insofar as 83% of the establishments in our sample do not change 
family ownership between 1998 and 2004, the estimate of the coefficient of ∆D would be 
essentially driven by firms not changing wage policy. As a consequence, it would mainly be 
determined by the correlation of changes in wages and changes in dismissals with adverse 
shocks, which would explain its negative sign. Consistent with this interpretation, when we 
re-estimate  the specification  on the subsample of establishments that did not change 
ownership between 1998 and 2004 – Table 9, Column 2 – we still obtain a negative estimate 
for the coefficient of ∆D. By contrast, when estimating equation (11) on the subsample of 
establishments that did change family ownership, we find some evidence of compensating 
wage differential. In this case, the effects of potential shocks affecting the establishments are 
dominated by the change in wage and job-security policy brought about by the change in 
family ownership. An increase in dismissals is then positively associated with a positive 
change in log wages (at the 10% significance level) and the magnitude of the coefficient on 
∆Family Firm is reduced by 44% – from -0.34 in Table 4, Column 3, to -0.19 in Table 9, 
Column 3 – and is no longer significant at conventional levels. We interpret this result as 
suggesting that part of the change in wages experienced by stayers when family ownership 
changes is due to a compensating wage differential mechanism: following a transition from 
non-family to family ownership wages tend to go down, but in exchange workers benefit from   26 
greater job security. Similarly if a family firm becomes non-family owned, wages go up for 
stayers partly as a compensation of reduced job security.  
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper, we provide evidence that French family firms offer a specific compensation 
package to their employees involving lower wages but greater job security. Controlling for 
individual characteristics and establishment fixed effects, we find that family firms pay their 
employees about 5% less than non-family firms. This result is identified by changes in family 
ownership. Given that we do not have an instrument for changes in ownership, one needs to 
be cautious in interpreting our findings. However, the lack of correlation between the change 
in family ownership and pre-change firm characteristics and outcomes suggests that our 
estimates are unlikely to be seriously flawed by the endogeneity of the timing of ownership 
changes.  
Part of the family/non-family wage gap that we find appears to be due to differences in 
unobserved characteristics of workers across family and non-family firms. But part of it is 
also due to different wage policies being implemented by both categories of firms, so that the 
same worker’s pay is different in family and non-family companies. Ceteris paribus, family 
firms also feature a substantially lower dismissal rate than non-family firms, which is robust 
to controlling for establishment fixed effects. Moreover, when hit by a negative shock that 
induces employment downsizing, family firms appear to rely less on dismissals and more on 
hiring contraction than non-family firms in order to achieve the required staff adjustment. 
These results are confirmed by  information  on the workers’ perception of the risk of 
dismissal: workers in family firms feel that their job is more secure, even conditional on their 
wage level. The fact that family firms offer lower wages and greater job security suggests that 
some compensating wage differential mechanism may be at play. We find evidence of such 
compensation for workers who stay in the same establishment when firm ownership changes: 
we estimate that about half of the decrease in their wage is accounted for by a lower risk of 
dismissal when ownership changes from non-family to family ownership  (and vice versa 
when ownership changes the other way round).  
What explains the difference between family and non-family firms in terms of compensation 
packages?  The agency theory provides a first explanation. It indeed states that executive 
compensation is designed to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders   27 
(Murphy, 1999). As underlined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) the risk of misalignment is 
larger for firms with dispersed ownership because it is more difficult for shareholders to 
control managers' actions. In contrast, managers have less discretion as to the actions they 
take when there are large blockholders. So, in equilibrium, managers' compensation 
(including wages, premiums and bonuses) should be more performance-related and therefore 
on average higher in non-family  firms, where control is looser.  This extends to non-
managerial workers as soon as intrinsinc motivations,  such as aversion to within-firm 
inequality, are taken into account (see Rebitzer and Taylor, 2011). This may also explain 
greater job insecurity in non-family firms if firms with dispersed ownership use the threat of 
dismissal under bad performances as a tool to create more powerful incentives. 
An alternative theory consistent with our findings is provided by the literature in finance. This 
suggests that family firms may have a comparative advantage at credibly committing to long-
term relationships, including long-lasting job matches. The main reason for this is that 
families have long-term horizons
38
Whatever the theory elicited to explain our findings, they seem consistent with a multiple 
equilibrium model, in which family firms are in a low-pay/high-job-security equilibrium, 
while non-family firms are in a high-pay/low-job-security one. Changing ownership is then 
equivalent to moving from one equilibrium to the other. Why do some workers go away and 
others stay in the same establishment when this occurs? Those who stay  are presumably 
workers with high moving costs. Once these moving costs are taken into account, they are 
 and are therefore more prone to investment opportunities 
that are profitable only in the long-run (see e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006). As a consequence, family firms may have a comparative advantage at offering 
job security and may therefore afford to pay lower wages. In addition, our results suggest that 
they might have a comparative disadvantage at innovation, in particular as regards the use of 
ICT and innovative managerial practices. This would turn into a comparative advantage of 
non-family firms at offering attractive pay schemes and hence higher wages in compensation 
for lower job security – on which they cannot credibly commit.  
                                                 
38 The idea that family firms have longer time horizon might seem at odd with the fact that in our data, changes 
from family to non-family ownership are as frequent as changes from non-family to family ownership. Let us 
underline though that this does not imply that family firms change main shareholder as frequently as non-family 
firms. Firms may indeed change main shareholder either because they switch from family to non-family 
ownership (or the other way round) or they may change main shareholder while remaining family owned or non-
family owned. The REPONSE survey also has direct information on all changes in main shareholder for the 
period 2002-2004. In our sample only 8% of family  firms changed main shareholder over this period as 
compared to 19% for non-family firms. This suggests that family firms change ownership much less frequently 
than non-family firms which is consistent with the idea that they have a longer time horizon.    28 
indifferent between both types of equilibrium to the extent that they are compensated: by 
higher wages in exchange for lower job security when ownership changes from family to non-
family and by greater job security in exchange for lower pay when the transition takes place 
the other way round.  
Other workers leave their establishment when ownership changes. One potential explanation 
for this might be the existence of a complementarity between ICT and innovative managerial 
practices on the one hand and high ability on the other. In this case, high-ability workers 
would leave firms when they become family-owned because family firms would not 
compensate them properly for the  large  decrease in wages they would  have to suffer  if 
staying,  due to the sharp reduction in the intensity of ICT and innovative managerial 
practices. Symmetrically, low-ability workers would leave family firms when they become 
non-family either because they get fired or because they are offered wage levels which do not 
compensate them for the lower degree of job security. However, our data do not quite support 
this interpretation. When controlling for changes in ICT and managerial practices interacted 
with Leaver in equation (2), the coefficients on both interaction terms are insignificant and the 
point estimate and standard error on ∆F*Leaver remain unchanged. This suggests that the 
assortative matching we observe between high (resp. low) ability workers and non-family 
(resp. family) firms is not driven by their different intensity of use of ICT and innovative 
managerial practices.  
An alternative explanation would then be that workers who leave their establishment when 
ownership changes have different preferences in terms of wages and/or job security. High-
ability workers would leave non-family firms when they become family-owned because they 
have a relative preference for wages over job security, whereas the opposite holds for low-
ability workers leaving family firms when they become non-family owned. Some very 
preliminary indication of this can be found in our data. In the worker section  of the 
REPONSE survey, individuals are asked what pushes them to put a lot of themselves into 
their job. "Wage incentives" and "promotion prospects" are among the possible choices and 
for each of them workers may answer "yes, a lot", "yes, to some extent", "not really", "not at 
all". For each item, we group answers into two categories: "yes" and "no". Regressing the 
wage incentive and promotion prospect indicators on our dummy variable for family 
ownership  and the  usual set of individual and establishment-level controls, we find that 
workers in family firms are significantly less sensitive to wage incentives and to  career   29 
prospects than workers in non-family firms.
39
                                                 
39 The corresponding point estimates and standard errors are -0.52 (0.018) for wage incentives and -0.42 (0.017) 
for career prospects. The results are qualitatively similar if controlling for the worker's wage and her exposure to 
a wage incentive scheme. 
 This is consistent with assortative matching 
taking place on the basis of preferences as evidenced, for top managers, by Bandiera et al. 
(2010). Our data do not allow us to go further along these lines. However, investigating 
potential differences in preferences across workers employed in family vs. non-family firms 
appears to be a promising avenue for future research. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1  Family firms and wages in 2004 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Log Wage  Log Wage  Log Wage  Log Wage 
         
Family firm  -0.198***  -0.042***  -0.024***  -0.029*** 
(0.012)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
         
Observations  511,230  502,452  417,071  402,862 
R-squared  0.064  0.631  0.626  0.638  
Workers' controls   no  yes  yes  yes 
Establishments' controls  no  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for ICT and Manag. Pract.  no  no  yes  no 
Control for log productivity  no  no  no  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: log gross hourly wage. Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment is 
part of a firm which is family-owned and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in 
parentheses. (3) Workers’ controls  include: age (8 classes), tenure (3 classes), occupation (4 groups: 
manager, technician or supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and a dummy variable for working full time. 
(4) Establishment controls include: establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), region, presence of 
union representative, being listed on the stock market and industry dummies (at 2-digits of the NACE, 
Rev.1, classification). (5) ICT and Management Practices are the intensity of use of information and 
communication technologies and of innovative managerial practices, respectively. Log productivity is the 




Table 2 Family firms, ICT, management practices and wages -   
Establishment fixed effects, 1998-2004. 
   (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable  Log Wage  Log Wage 
     
Family firm  -0.049***  -0.047*** 
(0.014)  (0.015) 
Family firm*Family firm in 1998    -0.004 
  (0.032) 
     
Observations  8,812  8,812 
R-squared  0.784  0.784 
Workers' controls   yes  yes 
Controls for ICT and Management Pract.  yes  yes 
Other time-varying establishment controls  yes  yes 
Time dummy  yes  yes 
Establishment fixed-effects  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: log gross hourly wage. Family firm  takes value 1 if the 
establishment is part of a firm which is family-owned and 0 otherwise. Family firm in 1998 
takes value 1 if the establishment was part of a firm which is family-owned in 1998. (2) 
Robust standard errors, clustered on firms by years, in parentheses. (3) ICT and Management 
Practices are the intensity of use of information and communication technologies and of 
innovative managerial practices, respectively. All regressions include two dummy variables 
that take the value 1 if ICT (resp. management practices) is missing (4) Workers’ controls 
include: age (8 classes), tenure (8 classes), occupation (4 groups: manager, technician or 
supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and a dummy variable for working full time. (5) Other 
time-varying establishment controls include: establishment size (6 classes), presence of union 
representative and being listed on the stock market. (6) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   33 
Table 3. Change in family ownership and wages of leavers, arrivers and stayers. 
   (1)  (2) 




     
Leaver  0.014   
(0.011)   
Leaver*∆Family firm  0.065***   
(0.022)   
Arriver    0.026* 
  (0.016) 
Arriver*∆Family firm    -0.001 
  (0.020) 
     
Observations  4,568  4,275 
R-squared  0.829  0.832 
Establishment fixed effects  yes  yes 
Workers' controls  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable indicated in the column title. Leaver takes value 1 if the worker separated from the 
establishment between 1998 and 2004. Arriver takes value 1 if the worker was hired in the establishment between 1998 
and 2004. Only workers aged 60 or less in 2004 who joined the DADS panel in 1998 or before are included. ∆Family 
firm takes value 1 if the establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if it was family-owned in 1998 
and not in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in parentheses. (5) Workers' controls 
include the following groups (except when the group is used to define the dependent variable): age (8 classes), tenure (3 
classes), occupation (4 groups: manager, technician or supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and a dummy variable for 
working full time. (6) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4  Changes in ownership and wage growth 1998-2004 
   All establishments 
Establishments that 
changed ownership 
between 1998 and 2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  ∆Log Wage ∆Log Wage ∆Log Wage ∆Log Wage 
         
∆Family Firm 
-0.032**  -0.032**  -0.034**  -0.034** 
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Log Relative wage 1998 
  -0.012    -0.009 
  (0.038)    (0.062) 
         
Observations  2,663  2,663  487  487 
R-squared  0.099  0.099  0.261  0.261 
Changes in ICT and Management Pract.  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Changes in workers' controls   yes  yes  yes  yes 
Changes in establishments' controls  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: change in log gross hourly wage between 1998 and 2004. ∆Family firm takes value 1 
if the establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if it was family-owned in 1998 and not in 2004 
and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust  standard errors, clustered on firms, in parentheses. (3) Relative wage in 1998  is 
difference between the log wage of each individual and the average log wage of the establishment, computed in 
1998. (4) Changes in ICT and Management Practices respectively denote the change in the intensity of use of 
information and communication technologies, and in innovative managerial practices. All regressions include two 
dummy variables that take the value 1 if change in ICT (resp. change in management practices) is missing (5) 
Changes in workers’ controls include change in occupation (defined in 4 groups), change in age (defined in 8 
classes), change in tenure (defined in 8 classes) and change in working full time (6) Changes in establishments’ 
controls include change in firm size, change in the presence of union representative, change in stock market listing, 
all measured between 1998 and 2004. (7) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   34 
 
Table 5  Family ownership and average separation rates 2001-2007 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




             
Family firm  -0.153***  0.055  0.003  0.024  -0.141  -0.348 
(0.046)  (0.079)  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.260)  (0.348) 
             
Observations  1,295  1,295  1,295  1,295  1,295  1,295 
R-squared  0.433  0.528  0.468  0.506  0.387  0.462 
establishment controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
ctrl for ICT and Managt Pract  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
workers' characteristics  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: establishment-level average of quarterly separation rates over 2001-2007, computed for 
each type of separation (rate of dismissals, rate of quits, etc.) as indicated in column titles. Only establishments with non-
missing observations for at least 9 quarters in 2001-2007 are included. Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment is 
part of a firm which is family-owned  in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2)  Robust  standard errors, clustered on firms, in 
parentheses. (3) Establishment controls include: establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), region, presence of union 
representative, being listed on the stock market and industry dummies (at 4-digits of the NACE, Rev.1, classification). (4) 
ICT and Management Practices are the intensity of use of information and communication technologies and of innovative 
managerial practices, respectively. (5)  Workers'  characteristics  include: the proportion of women, the proportion of 
workers below 40 years old and the proportion of employees in 4 occupational groups (managers, technicians and 




Table 6 Changes in family ownership and changes in separations 1998-2004 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







                    
∆Family Firm  -0.150**  -0.109  0.052  -0.016  -0.015  -0.179 
  (0.076)  (0.094)  (0.047)  (0.017)  (0.356)  (0.422) 
             
Observations  257  257  257  257  257  257 
R-squared  0.075  0.059  0.075  0.076  0.049  0.047 
Time-varying establishment 
controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Change in workers' 
characteristics  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: change in the establishment-level average of quarterly separation rates over 3-years 
periods centred on 1998 and 2004, computed for each type of separation (rate of dismissals, rate of quits, etc.) as 
indicated in column titles. Only establishments with non-missing observations for at least 9 quarters in each 3-year 
periods are included.  ∆Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if 
it was family-owned in 1998 and not in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in 
parentheses. (3) time varying establishment controls include change in firm size (defined in 6 classes), change in the 
presence of union representative, change in listing on the stock market, change in age (defined in 5 classes), change in 
the use of information and communication technologies, and change the use of innovative managerial practices, all 
measured between 1998 and 2004. (4) All regressions include two dummy variables that take the value 1 if change in 
ICT (resp. change in management practices) is missing. (5) Changes in workers’ characteristics include changes in the 
proportion of workers by occupation (defined in 4 groups) and by gender. (6) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   35 
Table 7  Sensitivity of dismissal and hiring rates to job creation and job destruction 
 
Panel A  Dismissal rates, job creation and job destruction 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








              
Job creation rate  0.021**  0.021**  0.036***  0.010** 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
Job destruction rate  0.115***  0.122***  0.161***  0.121*** 
  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.033)  (0.010) 
Job creation rate x Family firm    -0.035*  -0.060***  -0.020* 
    (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.011) 
Job destruction rate x Family firm    -0.152**  -0.252***  -0.078** 
    (0.070)  (0.084)  (0.033) 
         
Observations  38,360  38,360  31,236  31,147 
R-squared  0.247  0.286  0.455  0.723 
establishment fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
establishment controls - reduced x 
JCR/JDR.  no  no  yes  yes 
establishment controls - extended x 
JCR/JDR.  no  no  no  yes 
workers' characteristics x JCR/JDR.  no  no  yes  yes 
 
 
Panel B  Hiring rates, job creation and job destruction 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Hiring rate  Hiring rate  Hiring rate  Hiring rate 
              
Job creation rate  1.019***  1.016***  1.011***  0.993*** 
  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
Job destruction rate  -0.235***  -0.223***  -0.155***  -0.236*** 
  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.020) 
Job creation rate x Family firm    -0.042  -0.077**  -0.055* 
    (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Job destruction rate x Family firm    -0.251***  -0.170**  -0.175*** 
    (0.067)  (0.082)  (0.050) 
         
Observations  38,360  38,360  31,236  31,147 
R-squared  0.751  0.756  0.763  0.784 
establishment fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
establishment controls - reduced x 
JCR/JDR.  no  no  yes  yes 
establishment controls - extended x 
JCR/JDR.  no  no  no  yes 
workers' characteristics x JCR/JDR.  no  no  yes  yes 
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Table 7  (cont.) 
 
Notes: (1) Each column presents the results of a separate regression. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
quarterly dismissal rate computed, at the establishment level, as the total number of dismissals during a 
quarter over the average employment level during that quarter. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the 
quarterly hiring rate computed, at the establishment level, as the total number of hires during a quarter over 
the average employment level during that quarter. Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment is part of a 
firm which is family-owned in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in 
parentheses. (3) Job creation rate (JCR) and Job destruction rate (JDR) are respectively the job creation and 
job destruction rates in the establishment. The JCR (resp. JDR) is defined as the ratio of the net growth rate 
of employment between the beginning and the end of a quarter to the average employment level during that 
quarter, if the former is positive (resp. negative). (4) Establishment controls – reduced include: presence of 
union representative, being listed on the stock market, the use of information and communication 
technologies and the intensity of innovative managerial practices. (5) Establishment controls – extended 
include the previous establishment controls plus establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), region and 
industry dummies (at 2-digits of the NACE, Rev.1, classification). (6) Workers' characteristics include: the 
proportion of women, the proportion of workers below 40 years old and the proportion of employees in 4 
occupational groups (managers, technicians and supervisors, clerks, blue-collars). (7) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.   37 
Table 8  Family firms and perceived risk of dismissal in 2004 
 
   (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable  Risk of   Risk of  
  dismissal  dismissal 
        
Family firm  -0.106**  -0.106** 
  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Log wage    -0.064 
    (0.063) 
     
Observations  3,591  3,579 
R-squared  0.094  0.096 
workers' controls  yes  yes 
establishments' controls  yes  yes 
control for ICT and management practices  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Each column presents the results of a separate regression, run at the 
individual worker level, where the dependent variable is the perceived risk of dismissal, 
evaluated on a 1-4 scale. Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment is part of a firm 
which is family-owned in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on 
firms, in parentheses. (3) Workers’ controls include: age (8 classes), tenure (3 classes), 
occupation (4 groups: manager, technician or supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and 
a dummy variable for working full time.  (4)  Establishment controls  include: 
establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), region, presence of union representative, 
being listed on the stock market and industry dummies.  (5)  ICT  and  Management 
Practices respectively denote the intensity of use of information and communication 
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Table 9  Testing for compensating wage differentials, 1998-2004 
 
   All 
Establishments 
Establishments that did not 
change ownership 
between 1998 and 2004 
Establishments that 
changed ownership 
between 1998 and 2004  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable  ∆Log Wage  ∆Log Wage  ∆Log Wage 
       
∆Family firm 
-0.036**  -  -0.019 
(0.017)  -  (0.015) 
∆Dismissal rate 
-0.005  -0.009  0.050* 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.026) 
       
Observations  2575  2095  480 
R-squared  0.103  0.127  0.310 
changes in ICT and Management Pract.  yes  yes  yes 
changes in workers' controls   yes  yes  yes 
changes in establishments' controls  yes  yes  yes 
Notes:  (1)  Dependent variable: change in log gross hourly wage between 1998 and 2004. ∆Family firm  takes value 1 if the 
establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if it was family-owned in 1998 and not in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (3) ∆Dismissal rate is the change in the average quarterly dismissal rate (computed over 3-years 
periods centred around 1998 and 2004). (4) Changes in ICT and Management Practices respectively denote the change in the intensity 
of use of information and communication technologies, and in innovative managerial practices. (5) All regressions include two dummy 
variables that take the value 1 if change in ICT (resp. change in management practices) is missing. (6) Changes in workers’ controls 
include change in occupation (defined in 4 groups), change in age (defined in 8 classes), change in tenure (defined in 8 classes) and 
change in working full time (7) Changes in establishments’ controls include change in firm size, change in the presence of union 
representative, change in listing on the stock market, all measured between 1998 and 2004. (8) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 






























(2133 obs.)  
Establishments belonging to 
family firms (1087 obs.) 
Establishments belonging to 
non family firms (1046 obs.) 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Family firms  0.510  0.500  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ICT use (standardized index)  0  1  -0.277  0.991  0.289  0.926 
Management practices (standardized index)  0  1  -0.312  1.044  0.305  0.851 
Establishment size (total employees)  340.2  608.7  244.7  487.8  439.4  699.5 
Establishment age:                 
less than 5 years  0.035  0.185  0.030  0.169  0.041  0.199 
5 to 9 years  0.072  0.259  0.068  0.252  0.076  0.265 
10 to 19 years  0.218  0.413  0.233  0.423  0.203  0.402 
20 to 49 years  0.425  0.495  0.448  0.498  0.402  0.490 
50 years or more  0.249  0.433  0.220  0.415  0.279  0.449 
Presence of union representative  0.648  0.478  0.495  0.500  0.807  0.395 
Listed firms or belonging to a listed group  0.431  0.495  0.200  0.400  0.674  0.469 
Productivity (in K€ per worker)  59.49  50.23  49.75  29.44  70.43  64.49   40 





















to family firms  
(178,989 obs.) 
Establishments belonging 
to non family firms  
(332,241 obs.) 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
                    
Gross hourly wage (€)  17.22  8.180  15.57  7.667  18.11  8.304 
Female  0.312  0.463  0.358  0.479  0.287  0.452 
Occupation             
Manager  0.177  0.382  0.134  0.340  0.201  0.401 
Supervisor or technician  0.251  0.434  0.210  0.408  0.273  0.446 
Clerk  0.173  0.378  0.260  0.439  0.126  0.332 
Blue collar  0.399  0.490  0.398  0.489  0.400  0.490 
Full time worker  0.929  0.257  0.919  0.272  0.934  0.248 
Age  39.44  10.09  38.58  10.09  39.90  10.07 
Tenure             
      Less than 1 year  0.099  0.299  0.119  0.324  0.089  0.284 
      1 to 2  years  0.164  0.370  0.159  0.365  0.166  0.373 
      More than two years  0.737  0.440  0.722  0.448  0.745  0.436   41 
Table A3  Means of changes in variables, 1998-2004 
Variables 
    Mean                 Std. Dev. 
     
Individual-level data     
Change in log hourly gross wage  0.168  0.174 
Change in occupation     
      Manager  0.026  0.184 
      Technicians and supervisor  0.016  0.363 
      Clerk  -0.004  0.228 
      Blue-collar  -0.038  0.302 
Change in full time work  -0.030  0.218 
     
Establishment-level data     
Family owned 2004 – family owned 1998  0.017  0.416 
Change in ICT  0.436  0.720 
Change in management practices  0.775  0.810 
Change in being listed  0.028  0.412 
Change in union representatives  0.050  0.331 
Change in size  8.372  133.2 







Table A4  Average of quarterly gross job and worker flows in percentage of employment, 
establishment level, 2001-2007 
 
 
Variables (in %) 
Whole sample 
(1,803 obs.)  
Establishments belonging 
to family firms  
(858 obs.) 
Establishments belonging to 
non family firms  
(945 obs.) 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Job creation rate  1.83  2.79  2.29  3.53  1.41  1.78 
Job destruction rate  1.81  3.02  1.93  3.18  1.70  2.86 
Hiring rate  4.48  6.48  5.82  7.39  3.27  5.23 
Separation rate  4.49  6.36  5.47  6.85  3.60  5.74 
By reason of separation:             
Dismissal  0.54  0.87  0.53  0.79  0.55  0.94 
Quit  1.08  1.77  1.37  1.99  0.81  1.50 
Retirement  0.18  0.26  0.16  0.23  0.19  0.28 
End of trial period  0.16  0.80  0.20  0.85  0.12  0.75 
End of fixed-term contract  2.16  4.35  2.84  5.08  1.55  3.44   42 
 
Table A5  Family firms and wages in 2004 – Non-managerial workers only 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Log Wage  Log Wage  Log Wage  Log Wage 
         
Family firm  -0.152***  -0.038***  -0.021**  -0.026*** 
(0.010)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
         
Observations  420,492  414,827  348,648  340,160 
R-squared  0.061  0.467  0.465  0.487 
Workers' controls   no  yes  yes  yes 
Establishments' controls  no  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for ICT and Manag. Pract.  no  no  yes  no 
Control for log productivity  no  no  no  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: log gross hourly wage of non managers. Family firm  takes value 1 if the 
establishment is part of a firm which is family-owned and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on 
firms, in parentheses. (3) Workers’ controls include: age (8 classes), tenure (3 classes), occupation (4 groups: 
manager, technician or supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and a dummy variable for working full time. (4) 
Establishment controls  include: establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), region, presence of union 
representative, being listed on the stock market and industry dummies (at 2-digits of the NACE, Rev.1, 
classification). (5) ICT and Management Practices are the intensity of use of information and communication 
technologies and of innovative managerial practices, respectively. Log productivity is the log of value added per 





Table A6  Family firms and wages - Without establishment fixed effects, 1998 and 2004. 
 
   (1) 
Dependent variable  Log Wage 
   
Family firm  -0.027* 
(0.015) 
   
Observations  8,800 
R-squared  0.687 
Workers' controls   yes 
Establishment controls  yes 
Controls for ICT and Management Practices  yes 
Time dummy  yes 
Establishment fixed-effects  no 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: log gross hourly wage. Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment is part of a 
firm which is family-owned and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in parentheses. (3) 
ICT and Management Practices are the intensity of use of information and communication technologies and of 
innovative managerial practices, respectively. All regressions include two dummy variables that take the value 1 
if ICT (resp. management practices) is missing. (4) Workers’ controls include: age (8 classes), tenure (8 classes), 
occupation (4 groups: manager, technician or supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and a dummy variable for 
working full time. (5) Establishment controls include: establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), region, 
presence of union representative, being listed on the stock market and industry dummies corresponding to the 2-
digit NACE (Rev.1) classification. (6) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7: Change in family ownership and firm pre-change characteristics - Point estimates 
and standard errors on ∆Family firm  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable  ROE  ROCE  Log 




             
1998 Level  0.003  -0.022  -0.007  0.082  0.008  0.073 
(0.031)  (0.024)  (0.048)  (0.164)  (0.028)  (0.129) 
1994-1998 Change  0.055  -0.005  0.025  0.048  0.017  - 
(0.125)  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.131)  (0.022)  - 
             
Notes: (1) Each cell corresponds to a different regression where the dependent variable is indicated in the column titles 
(in level or changes as specified in line headings). Each cell shows point estimates and standard errors of the ∆Family 
firm variable where ∆Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if it 
was family-owned in 1998 and not in 2004 and 0 otherwise.  (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in 
parentheses. (3) ROE (Return On Equity) is the percentage ratio of net profits to equity, ROCE (Return on Capital 
Employed) is the percentage ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to capital employed, log Productivity is 
the log of value added per worker, log Size is the log of the number of employees, log Wage is the log of the gross 
annual wage and log Firm Age is the log of firm age; all these variables are defined at the firm level. (4) All equations 
with a dependent variable in levels include the following establishment-level controls –  intensity in ICT and 
management practices, region, presence of union representative, being family-owned, being listed on the stock market 
and industry dummies corresponding to the 2-digit NACE (Rev.1) classification. No control is included in equations 




Table A8. Change in family ownership and characteristics of leavers and stayers. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Dependent variable  ∆Log Wage 
1994-1998 
∆Log Wage 
2004-2006  Log Age  Female  Manager 
& Tech.  Full-time  Log 
Tenure 
               
Leaver  0.011  0.029**  -0.078***  0.001  0.049**  0.013  -0.513*** 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.008)  (0.053) 
Leaver*∆Family 
firm 
-0.011  -0.017  -0.007  -0.054  -0.044  0.013  -0.036 
(0.025)  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.012)  (0.140) 
               
Observations  2,477  2,575  4,568  4,568  4,568  4,568  4,188 
R-squared  0.566  0.477  0.450  0.564  0.494  0.539  0.598 
Estab. fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Workers' controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable indicated in the column title. Unless otherwise specified, year is 1998. In Columns 4, 5 
and 6 the dependent variable is dichotomous. Leaver takes value 1 if the worker separated from the establishment 
between 1998 and 2004. Only workers aged 60 or less in 2004 who joined the panel DADS in 1998 or before are 
included. ∆Family firm takes value 1 if the establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if it was 
family-owned in 1998 and not in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in parentheses. 
(3) In Column 1 only those that were in the same establishment in both 1994 and 1998 are included. In Column 2 those 
staying with the same establishment between 1998 and 2004 but leaving it between 2004 and 2006 are excluded. (4) In 
Column 2 establishment fixed effects refer to establishments in 1998. (5) Workers' controls include the following 
groups (except when the group is used to define the dependent variable): age (8 classes), tenure (3 classes), occupation 
(4 groups: manager, technician or supervisor, clerk, blue-collar), gender and a dummy variable for working full time. 
When Log Age is the dependent variable, log Tenure is not included and vice versa. Changes in workers’ controls over 
1994-1998 and 2004-2008 are included in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. (6) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   44 
Table A9 : Change in ownership and wage growth of stayers, 1998-2004 
– Restricted sample  
   (1)  (2) 
  All establishments 
Establishments that  
changed ownership  
between 1998 and 2004 
Dependent variable  ∆Log Wage  ∆Log Wage 
     
∆Family Firm 
-0.046**  -0.034* 
(0.018)  (0.017) 
     
Observations  2,017  373 
R-squared  0.151  0.291 
     
changes in ICT and Management Pract.  yes  yes 
changes in workers' controls   yes  yes 
changes in establishments' controls  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Individuals in the top and bottom decile of the distribution of relative wages in 1998 are excluded from 
the sample. (2) Dependent variable: change in log gross hourly wage between 1998 and 2004. ∆Family firm takes 
value 1 if the establishment was family-owned in 2004 and not in 1998, -1 if it was family-owned in 1998 and not in 
2004 and 0 otherwise. (3) Robust standard errors, clustered on firms, in parentheses. (4) Changes in ICT and 
Management Practices respectively denote the change in the intensity of use of information and communication 
technologies, and in innovative managerial practices. All regressions include two dummy variables that take the 
value 1 if change in ICT (resp. change in management practices) is missing (5) Changes in workers’ controls 
include change in occupation (defined in 4 groups), change in age (defined in 8 classes), change in tenure (defined 
in 8 classes) and change in working full time (6) Changes in establishments’ controls include change in firm size, 
change in the presence of union representative, change in stock market listing, all measured between 1998 and 2004. 




Table A10: Family firms and dismissals: 2001-2007 with control  
for permanent workers and 2003-2005 
   (1)  (2) 




        
Family firm  -0.136***  -0.144** 
  (0.046)  (0.062) 
% of permanent workers  0.003***   
  (0.001)   
     
Observations  1,280  1,090 
R-squared  0.431  0.397 
establishment controls  yes  yes 
controls for ICT and Management Practices  yes  yes 
workers' characteristics  yes  yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: establishment-level average of quarterly dismissal rates over the periods indicated in 
column titles. Only establishments with non-missing observations for at least 9 quarters are included. Family firm takes 
value 1 if the establishment is part of a firm which is family-owned in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (2) Robust standard errors, 
clustered on firms, in parentheses. (3) Establishment controls include: establishment size (6 classes), age (5 classes), 
region, presence of union representative, being listed on the stock market and industry dummies corresponding to the 4-
digit NACE (Rev.1) classification. (4) ICT and Management Practices are the intensity of use of information and 
communication technologies and of innovative managerial practices, respectively. (5) Workers' characteristics include: 
the proportion of women, the proportion of workers below 40 years old and the proportion of employees in 4 
occupational groups (managers, technicians and supervisors, clerks, blue-collars). (6) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Data Appendix 
1. Sample Definition  
 
The REPONSE dataset covers 2,930 establishments in 2004. We keep only firms being either family 
owned or for which ownership is dispersed, private-equity or joint-ventures, thereby dropping all 
associations, charities and governmental organisations operating in the business sector as well as firms 
owned by  their own workers, by the government or by other types of shareholders  (e.g. mutual 
companies). This brings down our sample to 2,133 establishments. For 481 of these establishments we 
have data on family ownership in 1998 by using the panel subsample of the REPONSE survey. 
 
1.1 Wage equations 
 
We matched our selection of REPONSE establishments with Social Security records (the DADS 
dataset). These contain information on gross hourly wages (constructed as gross annual wages divided 
by the number of hours worked), gender, age, occupation, working full time or part time, and a rough 
measure of job tenure for nearly all workers in the French private sector. We remove from the DADS 
dataset CEOs and top executives as well as small jobs, farmers, apprentices, workers under a 
subsidized contract, employees working at home and employees working less than one month in the 
year. We also exclude employees working on average less than 6 or more than 10 hours per day or 
aged less than 21 or more than 59 years. We also drop the lowest and highest percentiles of the hourly 
wage distribution of the remaining workers and we exclude establishments for which we do not have 
at least 5 valid observations (17 establishments). These operations are aimed at selecting core workers 
for whom we have a good measure of the hourly wage. Our final sample contains 511,230 employees 
working, in 2004, in 1,995 establishments (1,748 firms) being either family owned or having a 
dispersed ownership. 
 
The REPONSE survey was designed to have a panel subsample. The establishments belonging to this 
subsample were surveyed both in 1998 and in 2004. The panel subsample of the REPONSE survey 
was matched with the DADS panel on which we performed the same data cleaning as described in the 
previous paragraph for the cross-section dataset (except for the condition on the number of valid 
observations per establishment, that is obviously not applied in the case of the DADS panel). We 
exclude all establishments for which we do not have at least one valid observation in both 1998 and 
2004. After these operations, we are left with 4,713 workers in 1998 and 5,424 workers in 2004 from 
417 establishments (410 firms).  
 
1.2 Job security equations 
  
We matched our selection of REPONSE establishments with  the DMMO-EMMO dataset, which 
contains quarterly data on job and worker flows. Even if filling the DMMO-EMMO questionnaire is 
compulsory for all establishments with 50 or more employees and one fourth of the establishments 
with 10 to 49 employees, declarations are often incomplete. As a consequence, for our main sample 
(2001-2007) and once associations, charities and governmental organisations operating in the business 
sector as well as firms owned by their own workers, by the government or by other types of 
shareholders are excluded, the match results in 1,803 establishments that are linked at least once. 
Similarly, for the panel sample, we matched the panel subsamples of REPONSE 1998 and REPONSE 
2004 with, respectively, the 1997-1999 and 2003-2005 waves of the DMMO-EMMO, resulting in 374 
establishments that are linked at least once in each subperiod. The DMMO-EMMO database is 
composed of two datasets, one containing quarterly variables at the establishment level, including net 
employment growth and total number of movements  (hirings plus separations), and another one 
containing information for each movement (that is, for each hiring or separation event). 13 
establishment-by-quarter observations, for which the total number of movements in the two datasets 
were inconsistent, were also omitted from the sample. 
 
The REPONSE survey contains individual information for a subsample of employees, randomly 
drawn out of the group of workers with more than 15 months of tenure. For the subjective job security   46 
equations, we use a subsample of 4,599 workers in 1,856 establishments, for which data on perceived 
risk of dismissal and on ownership are available. As always, associations, charities and governmental 
organisations operating in the business sector as well as firms owned by their own workers, by the 
government or by other types of shareholders are excluded from this sample. 
 
2. Main variables 
 
2.1 Establishment- or firm-level variables 
 
Family ownership: managers are asked: "What is the type of the main category of shareholder of the 
firm?" Possible answers are family/individual/French or foreign financial company/ French or foreign 
non-financial company/the State/the workers/others. We define a dummy variable for family 
ownership which takes value 1 if the main category of shareholder is either a family or an individual 
and 0 otherwise. Source: REPONSE. 
 
ICT use: managers are asked what proportion of the employees use computers, the Internet or the 
Intranet. For each of these new technologies, the answer is coded from 0 to 4 with 0 corresponding to 
"nobody", 1 to "less than 5%", 2 to "5-19%", 3 to "20 to 49%" and 4 to "50% and more". Our ICT 
variable is defined as the sum of the answers over the three types of technologies. It thus captures the 
intensity of use of ICT at the establishment level and varies between 0 and 12. We standardise it to 0 
mean and 1 standard deviation. Source: REPONSE. 
 
Innovative managerial practices: our index of innovative managerial practices is the weighted sum 
of the following 8 composite variables, most of which are directly inspired by Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007): 
 
Performance dialogue. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 12. Sum of the 4 items below: 
•  Share of employees involved in  quality circles: nobody = 0, less than 5% = 1, from 5 to 
19% = 2, from 20 to 49% = 3, 50% and more = 4 
•  Share of employees involved in  shopfloor meetings: nobody = 0, less than 5% = 1, from 5 to 
19% = 2, from 20 to 49% = 3, 50% and more = 4 
•  Share of employees involved in  expression groups: nobody = 0, less than 5% = 1, from 5 to 
19% = 2, from 20 to 49% = 3, 50% and more = 4 
Workers’ participation. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 7. Sum of the 7 items below: 
•  firm project: no = 0, yes =1 
•  seminars: no = 0, yes =1 
•  firm newspaper: no = 0, yes =1 
•  open day: no = 0, yes =1 
•  suggestion box: no = 0, yes =1 
•  satisfaction survey: no = 0, yes =1 
•  quality action: no = 0, yes =1 
Workers’ autonomy. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 2. Sum of the 2 items below: 
•  In the event of incidents, workers are encouraged to refer to a supervisor = 0, to solve the 
problem themselves = 1 
•  work is defined : in terms of precise content = 0, in terms of goal to reach = 1 
Existence of targets. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 6. Sum of the 6 items below: 
Existence of quantitative targets in terms of: 
•  financial return: no = 0, yes =1 
•  budget balance: no = 0, yes =1 
•  labour cost: no = 0, yes =1 
•  quality: no = 0, yes =1 
•  growth: no = 0, yes =1 
•  security: no = 0, yes =1   47 
Managing human capital. Dummy variable that takes value 1 if there exists a training scheme, 0 
otherwise 
Rewarding high performance for managers. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 3. Sum the 3 items 
below: 
•  Existence of a bonus (premium) based on individual performance: no = 0, yes =1 
•  Existence of a bonus (premium) based on collective performance: no = 0, yes =1 
•  Existence of stock options schemes: no = 0, yes =1 
Rewarding high performance for non-managers.  Composite variable scoring from 0 to 3. Same 
components and scoring as for managers. 
Performance review. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 4. Sum of the 2 items below: 
•  Individual assessment for managers : no = 0, for some of them = 1, for all = 2 
•  Individual assessment for non-managers : no = 0, for some of them = 1, for all = 2 
Consequence management. Composite variable scoring from 0 to 4. Sum of the 2 items below: 
•  Impact of individual assessment on wages: no assessment or no impact = 0, indirect or long 
term impact = 1, direct impact = 2 
•  Impact of individual assessment on promotions: no assessment or no impact = 0, indirect or 
long term impact = 1, direct impact = 2 
 
Our summary index of innovative managerial practices is the sum of the above composite variables, 
each variable being weighted by the inverse of its maximum score. The raw summary index ranges 
between 0 and 8.4 (with mean 5.3), and is standardised to 0 mean and 1 standard deviation. Source: 
REPONSE. 
 
Establishment size: number of employees in the establishment. Computed at the end of the year and 
grouped into 6 categories: less than 50 workers, 50-99 workers, 100-199, 200-499, 500-999 and 1000 
workers and above. Source: DADS, when available, and REPONSE otherwise. 
 
Establishment age: grouped into 5 categories: less than 5 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, 20 to 49 
years and 50 years or more. Source: REPONSE. 
 
Presence of union representative: dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least 1 union 
representative in the establishment. Source: REPONSE. 
 
Percentage of permanent workers: proportion of workers on open-ended contracts. Source: 
REPONSE. 
 
Regions: 10 macro-regions in which the establishment is located, resulting from aggregation of French 
administrative regions. We create a dummy variable for each of them. Source: REPONSE. 
 
Industries: detailed NAF codes are available in REPONSE. Using a standard map we aggregate them 
at the 2-digit level of the NACE rev. 1 classification.  
 
Listed on the stock market: we build a dummy variable equals to 1 if the establishment is part of a 
firm listed on the stock market or belonging to a listed group. Source: REPONSE. 
 
Productivity: annual value-added per employee in K€, measured at the firm level. Source: DIANE.  
 
Return On Equity (ROE): percentage ratio of net profits to equity, measured at the firm level. For 
each year, we exclude top and bottom percentiles. Source: DIANE. 
 
Return On Capital Employed (ROCE): percentage ratio of company earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) to capital employed, measured at the firm level. For each year, we exclude top and 
bottom percentiles. Source: DIANE.   48 
 
Firm size: Number of employees in the firm. Source: DIANE. 
 
Average annual wages: ratio of the firm's gross wage bill to total number of employees, measured at 
the firm level. Source: DIANE. 
 
Firm age: difference between the current year and the year of incorporation. Source: DIANE. 
 
Job creation rate: ratio of the net growth of employment between the beginning and the end of a 
quarter to the average employment level during that quarter, if the former is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
The average employment level during a quarter is computed as half of the sum of the employment 
levels at the beginning and the end of the quarter. Source: DMMO-EMMO. 
 
Job destruction rate: ratio of the absolute value of net growth of employment between the beginning 
and the end of a quarter to the average employment level during that quarter, if the former is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. The average employment level during a quarter is computed as half of the sum of the 
employment levels at the beginning and the end of the quarter. Source: DMMO-EMMO. 
 
Separation rate: for each type of separation, ratio of all movements during a quarter – excluding 
those corresponding to job spells shorter than one month and transfers across establishments of the 
same firm – to the average employment level during that quarter (see above). Correspondingly, the 
total separation rate is the ratio of all separations – whatever their type – during a quarter to the 
average employment level during that quarter. Source: DMMO-EMMO. 
 
Hiring rate: ratio of all hires during a quarter to the average employment level of that quarter (see 
above). This ratio is obtained from the sum of separation and net employment growth rates, exploiting 
the identity for which net employment growth must be equal to hirings minus separations. Source: 
DMMO-EMMO. 
 
2.2 Individual-level variables 
 
All variables come from DADS except when elsewhere specified. 
 
Gross hourly wages include basic wages, and performance and non-performance related premiums 
and bonuses. They are net of employers and workers' social contributions but gross of income taxes.  
 
Risk of dismissal: Workers are asked: "In the next 12 months, do you feel that the risk that you lose 
your job is: very high/high/low/zero?" We build a variable equal to 1 if the perceived risk is zero, 2 if 
it is low, 3 if it is high and 4 if it is very high. Source: REPONSE. 
 
Occupations are grouped into 4 groups: managers, supervisors and technicians, clerks, blue-collars.  
 
Full time worker: dummy variable taking value 1 if the worker works full time, 0 otherwise.  
 
Age is grouped into 8 categories: 21 to 25 years, 26 to 30 years, 31 to 35 years, 36 to 40 years, 41 to 
45 years, 46 to 50 years, 51 to 55 years, 56 to 60 years. Workers aged 20 years or less or more than 60 
years are excluded from our sample. 
 
Job tenure is grouped into 3 categories in cross-section equations: 1 year or less, more than 1 to 2 
years, more than 2 years. More information is available in the DADS panel. In this case job tenure is 
grouped into 8 categories: 1 year or less, 1 to 2 years, 2 to 4 years, 4 to 7 years, 7 to 10 years, 10 to 15 
years, 15 to 20 years, more than 20 years. 
 